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COMMENTS
TORTS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-THE RESCUE DOCTRINE
Hammonds v. Haven, 280 S.W.2d 814 (Mo. 1955)
While driving along a state highway on a dark, rainy evening plain-
tiff encountered a tree, blown down during a rainstorm, which ob-
structed the road. Parking his car beside the road, plaintiff prepared
to warn approaching motorists of the danger. After failing in his at-
tempts to warn one oncoming motorist from a position adjacent to
the highway,1 plaintiff, upon sighting defendant approaching at a high
rate of speed, stationed himself in the center of the road and, lacking
other ready means of signaling, attempted to warn defendant by wav-
ing his arms. As defendant neared the fallen tree plaintiff leaped to-
ward the side of the road but was struck by defendant as the latter
swerved to avoid a collision. The trial court rendered judgment for
plaintiff, based upon the jury's finding that defendant was negligent
and plaintiff free from contributory negligence. While not contesting
the jury's finding of negligence, defendant appealed, contending that
plaintiff, by voluntarily assuming his perilous position, was contribu-
torily negligent as a matter of law. The Supreme Court of Missouri
affirmed, holding that under the rescue doctrine the question of plain-
tiff's contributory negligence was properly submitted to the jury. -
Although a party injured while voluntarily encountering a known
risk ordinarily will be barred from recovery by his own contributory
negligence, 3 when his conduct is motivated by the purpose of protect-
ing the life of another,4 judicial relief may be afforded, in certain situ-
ations, by the application of what is commonly termed the "rescue
doctrine." The courts have applied the rescue doctrine in two basic
factual situations. The standard rescue doctrine situation occurs when
a defendant negligently imperils the life of another and the plaintiff
1. The motorist crashed into the tree and damaged his car, but escaped unin-
jured. After consulting with plaintiff, he agreed to attempt to stop traffic coming
from one side of the fallen tree while plaintiff was to warn motorists approaching
from the opposite direction. Brief for Appellant, pp. 6, 7, Hammonds v. Haven,
280 S.W.2d 814 (Mo. 1955).
2. Hammonds v. Haven, 280 S.W.2d 814 (Mo. 1955). Plaintiff sued both the
defendant motorist and his employer, alleging that the motorist was acting
negligently while in the scope of his employment. Defendant's employer alone
appealed, asserting, in addition to the contributory negligence issue, that defen-
dant was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the acci-
dent. The Supreme Court also ruled for the plaintiff on this point. Id. at 818-19.
3. PROSSER, TORTS § 51 (2d ed. 1955); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 466(a), com-
ment e (1934).
4. In some jurisdictions the rescue doctrine also applies to reasonable efforts
to protect the property of another. The rescuer, of course, may reasonably en-
counter greater risks when saving human life than when merely protecting
property. PRossER, ToRTs § 49 (2d ed. 1955). Missouri has limited the rescue
doctrine to reasonable attempts to protect human life. Eversole v. Wabash R.R.,"
249 Mo. 523, 155 S.W. 419 (1913).
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is injured while attempting to rescue the person imperiled.5 In such a
situation it has become well-recognized that the negligent defendant
can be held liable to the rescuer as well as to the person rescued," and
the bulk of recent litigation in this area has involved the question of
whether the rescuer has maintained a standard of conduct which
would justify his obtaining relief. While many cases state that the
rescuer can recover unless his conduct is found to be "rash or reck-
less,"7 the more accurate formulation is that of the Restatement of
Torts, which permits recovery against the negligent defendant so long
as the rescuer's conduct is "reasonable" in view of all the circum-
stances of the situation.8
Given the rule that the rescuer's conduct must be that of a reason-
able man under the circumstances, there are two possible analytical
approaches upon which a judicial decision can be based: (1) the court
may determine that the scope of defendant's liability extends only to
reasonable rescue efforts, and that unreasonable rescue attempts are
an intervening force insulating defendant from liability; or (2) the
court may determine that the rescuer's conduct, if found to be un-
reasonable, constitutes contributory negligence and precludes recov-
ery. In practice, courts have seldom adopted one approach to the ex-
clusion of the other, and most opinions contain language susceptible of
application to both theories.9 While either approach would seem to be
substantially the same in terms of practical results, the failure of a
court to enunciate clearly which theory is being applied in an indi-
vidual case creates considerable confusion when an attempt is made to
analyze the basis for the decision. Regardless of the approach adopted,
however, it is apparent that the courts have been fully conscious of the
commendable motives of the rescuer, and have had little hesitancy in
permitting the jury to evaluate the reasonableness of his rescue ef-
forts.'0 Similarly, juries, well aware of the defendant's prior negli-
5. See, e.g., Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921);
Corbin v. Philadelphia, 195 Pa. 461, 45 Atl. 1070 (1900); Bond v. Baltimore &
O.R.R., 82 W. Va. 557, 96 S.E. 932 (1918).
6. Ibid. Cardozo's terse statement of the rescue doctrine is well-known:
Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief.
The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in trac:ng conduct to its
consequences. It recognizes them as normal. It places their effects within
the range of the natural and probable. The wrong that imperils life is a
wrong to the imperiled victim; it is a wrong also to his rescuer.
Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 180, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
7. Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871); Corb'n v. Philadelphia,
195 Pa. 461, 45 Atl. 1070 (1900); Bond v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 82 W. Va. 557,
96 S.E. 932 (1918).
8. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 472 (1934).
9. See, e.g., Berg v. Great Northern Ry., 70 Minn. 272, 73 N.W. 648 (1897);
Hogan v. Bragg, 41 N.D. 203, 170 N.W. 324 (1918).
10. This is no doubt reflective of the general judicial tendency to apply a
"double standard" in determining negligence and contributory negligence. See
James, Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691, 706 (1953); James & Dickin-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1955/iss4/9
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gence and naturally sympathetic toward the rescuer's position, have
readily returned a verdict for the plaintiff-rescuer.
While the principles applicable to the standard three-party rescue
situation have been fairly well-defined, there is still uncertainty con-
cerning a recently developed group of cases in which the rescuer is in-
jured while attempting to protect the defendant after the latter has
imperiled himself. In these cases the courts have had difficulty in find-
ing the defendant to be negligent, since negligence traditionally im-
plies a breach of duty, and it seems rather tenuous to reason that the
defendant owes himself a duty not to endanger his own life.1 The ma-
jority of courts encountering this problem have permitted the rescuer
to recover, however, conveniently avoiding the conceptual difficulty of
the situation by considering that the defendant was negligent in creat-
ing an undue risk of harm to any person attempting to rescue him.12
While this reasoning may do some injustice to the established duty
analysis of negligence, there is certainly a strong common-sense justi-
fication for permitting recovery by the rescuer, whose sacrifice of per-
sonal safety was required in order to save defendant from the con-
sequences of his own carelessness."
As in the other two-party rescue situations, the principal case in-
volves a rescuer injured while attempting to protect an imperiled de-
fendant. In addition, however, there are two peculiar factors present:
(1) the perilous situation resulted from a combination of defendant's
negligent driving and a concurring innocent cause-the fallen tree
obstructing the highway; and (2) the principal case is apparently the
first rescue situation in which the rescuer was not induced to act by de-
fendant's antecedent negligence. If defendant had not based his appeal
merely on the issue of contributory negligence, then the court would
have been able to consider directly the question of whether these un-
son, Accident Proneness and Accldent Law, 63 HARV. L. REV. 769, 786 (1950);
Leflar, The Declining Defense of Contributory Negligence, 1 ARK. L. REV. 1
(1946).
11. This was the basis for the decision denying recovery in Saylor v. Parsons,
122 Iowa 679, 98 N W. 500 (1904).
12. Brugh v. Bigelow, 310 Mich. 74, 16 N.W.2d 668 (1944); Carney v. Buyea,
271 App. Div. 338, 65 N.Y.S.2d 902 (4th Dep't 1946); Longacre v. Reddick, 215
S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948). It is possible, though hardly reasonable, to
distinguish these cases from the Saylor case, supra note 11, on the ground that
Saylor was the only case of this type in which the defendant's conduct merely
endangered himself, and was not also likely to subject bystanders to a risk of
harm.
13. The utter absurdity of distinguishing between the three-party and two-
p arty rescue situations can be illustrated by the factual situation in Brugh v.
Bigelow, 310 Mich. 74, 16 N.W.2d 668 (1944). Defendant's reckless driving had
caused his car to overturn, pinning himself and a passenger beneath the wreckage.
Plaintiff arrived, extricated the passenger, and then was injured while attempting
to rescue defendant. Had the court accepted the view that there is no liability
to a rescuer injured while protecting an imperiled defendant, it would have had to
deny recovery while at the same time admitting that the rescuer could have re-
covered if he had been injured while rescuing defendant's passenger. The court
quite properly permitted the rescuer to recover.
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usual factors, precluded application of the rescue doctrine. Since the
rescuer's contributory negligence was the only issue appealed it is
extremely difficult to evaluate the implications of the court's applica-
tion of the rescue doctrine. It is not unreasonable to infer, however,
that the court in the principal case, at least, would give slight weight
.to these factors, since they were raised by defendant while asserting
his defense of contributory negligence,'14 and the court did not con-
sider them of sufficient importance to merit discussion in the opinion,
It is still an open question, however, whether this case subsequently
will be considered as a precedent when a Missouri court is confronted
by a similar factual situation and has the opportunity to rule on these
peculiar problems.
It seems fairly certain, however, that the principal case, when con-
strued with a prior Missouri case, Dodson v. Maddox,5 has committed
the Missouri courts to the view that a defendant who has imperiled
himself can be held liable to his rescuer so long as the latter is not con-
tributorily negligent. Certainly, there can be no quarrel with this
view. Despite the factual distinction, there is no difference in prin-
ciple between the three-party and the two-party rescue situations. In
both situations the rescuer is motivated by the desire of protecting the
person whose life is imperiled; his conduct would be the same whether
the person rescued is the defendant himself or a third party imperiled
by the negligenc4 of the defendant. Thus, it is submitted that the
court correctly applied the rescue doctrine to the factual situation in
the principal case and, under that doctrine, properly submitted the
question of plaintiff's contributory negligence to the jury.
14. Brief for Appellant, pp. 23, 24, Hammonds v. Haven, 280 S.W.2d 814
(Mo. 1955).
15. 359 Mo. 742, 223 S.W.2d 434 (1949). In the Dodson case a gasoline trans-
port truck driven by defendant's servant crashed into a ditch and overturned,
pinning the driver underneath. While plaintiff was attempting to rescue the
driver the gasoline ignited causing plaintiff severe injuries: The court stated
that the rescue doctrine was not applicable, since there was no showing that
defendants had been negligent toward the person rescued, the driver of the truck.
The court apparently conceived of the rescue doctrine as applicable only in the
standard three-party situation in which the rescuer is injured while protecting
a third person imperiled by defendant's negligence. The court went on to hol,
however, that defendants, through their driver, were required to exercise ordi-
nary care in the operation of the vehicle and finally permitted plaintiff to recover
on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. The defendants in the Dodson case did not
assert that plaintiff was contributorily negligent; but rather relied on the bon-
tention that there was no showing of their negligence toward plaintiff. The
appeal of the case was thus the exact opposite of the principal case, where con-
tributory negligence alone was appealed. While neither case alone may be definite
authority, it would seem that, construing the two cases together, there is no ques-
tion that the Missouri courts are now com-mitted to allowing recovery by a reason-
able rescuer from a defendant who has imperiled himself.
The statement of the Dodson case regarding the applicability of the rescue
doctrine resulted in complete confusion. Prosser treats the case as accepting the
view that a defendant (or as in Dodson, the defendants' servant) negligently
imperiling himself becomes liable to his own rescuet. PRossER, TOaTs 173 (2d
ed. 1955). Yet the case has been criticized for its failure to apply the rescue
doctrine in the two-party rescue situation, 16 Mo. L. RFv. 68 (1951).
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